Cooperation when N is large: Evidence from the mining camps of the American West

 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Article in Press,

Abstract

The sources of cooperation in smallgroups are well documented. There is, however, less understanding aboutcooperation in large groups. I study the enforcement of property rightsin the mining camps of the American West. Miners demanded secureproperty rights and protection from violence to exploit the region'smineral wealth. In the model, miners must divide their labor betweenmining and supporting property rights institutions. The main predictionof the model is that cooperation in property rights enforcement emergesonly when social norms of cooperation are sufficiently widespread. Themodel also predicts that social norms are less effective in miningcamps with large populations or high labor productivity. I test thesepredictions against detailed evidence from the letters, diaries, andreminiscences of miners in 25 camps in California, Colorado, andMontana and find that the evidence supports the predictions. Theresults show that social norms can significantly lower the costs ofcollective action in large groups.

Keywords: Cooperation; Collective action; Social norms; Property rights; Large groups; Mining camps; American West