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Ett nytt normativt kriterium

I följande artikel

Brown, A.J.G., Merkl, C., and Snower, D.J. (2011). Comparing the Effectiveness of Employment Subsidies. Labour Economics, 18, 168-179.

använder författarna ett (för mig) nytt normativt kriterium: approximate welfare efficiency (AWE). Definitionen är som följer:

A policy is approximately welfare efficient when it
1. improves aggregate employment and welfare (defined in terms of the utility functions of the households),
2. does not increase earnings inequality (measured in terms of the
Gini coefficient), and
3. is self-financing

De motiverar kriteriet så här:

We argue that approximate welfare efficiency is a useful concept for policy making, since policies that are approximately welfare efficient are not only desirable for Benthamite reasons (the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people), but are unlikely to be blocked through the political process

I en fotnot lägger de till:

The reason is that the fear of rising earnings equality is the most common reason for blocking efficiency-improving employment reforms.

Intressant. Det hemmasnickrade kriteriet är yvigt och eklektiskt, men ändå sympatiskt.

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